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The economies of small developing states tend to be more 
fragile than those of large ones. This paper examines this 
issue in a dynamic context by focusing on the impact of 
the brain drain on North-South trade-related technology 
diffusion and total factor productivity growth in small 
and large states in the South. There are three main 
findings. First, productivity growth increases with North-
South trade-related technology diffusion and education 
and the interaction between the two, and decreases with 
the brain drain. Second, the impact of North-South 
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trade-related technology diffusion, education, and their 
interaction on productivity growth in small states is 
more than three times that for large countries, with the 
negative impact of the brain drain thus more than three 
times greater in small than in large states. And third, the 
greater loss in productivity growth in small states has 
two brain drain-related causes: a substantially greater 
sensitivity of productivity growth to the brain drain, and 
brain drain levels that are more than five times greater in 
small than in large states.   
 
 
North-South Trade-related Technology Diffusion, Brain Drain 



























JEL: F22, J61  
Keywords: brain drain, technology diffusion, trade, productivity growth 
 
* We would like to thank Edgardo Favaro, Alan Winters and seminar participants at the December 
2006 World Bank Conference on “Small States: Growth Challenges and Development Solutions” for 
their helpful comments and suggestions. This paper reflects the authors’ views and not necessarily  
those of the World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. 
 
 
a: Trade Unit, DECRG, World Bank, Washington, DC. E-mail: Mschiff@worldbank.org. 
b: The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. Ottawa, Canada. E-mail: 
Yanling_Wang@carleton.ca.  1. Introduction 
 
An important literature exists on the effects of countries’ human capital on their 
productivity growth, with most studies conducted in a closed-economy context. This 
paper focuses on the differential impact of human capital and South-North brain drain in 
small and large states. It provides an empirical analysis of the impact on total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth in the South of i) trade-related technology diffusion, human 
capital, and country size S, ii) the interaction between pairs of these variables, and iii) the 
interaction between the three variables.  
The use of trade-related technology diffusion as a determinant of productivity 
(TFP) growth in the South is based on the assumption that North-South trade provides a 
vehicle for the diffusion to the South of technology developed in the North. Second, the 
South’s absorption capacity – as measured by countries’ average level of human capital – 
is hypothesized to affect TFP growth as well as the impact of trade-related technology 
diffusion on TFP growth. 
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Sub-section 1.1 deals with 
the impact of trade on technology diffusion and TFP growth, Sub-section 1.2 provides 
figures on the brain drain for various categories of countries and regions, and Sub-section 
1.3 presents the main findings.  
 
1.1. Trade-Related Technology Diffusion and Productivity (TFP) Growth 
Until about two decades ago, while trade theory emphasized the importance of 
trade liberalization, empirical estimates of the gains from trade were found to be 
disappointingly small. The development of endogenous growth theory in the 1980s 
  2(Romer 1986, Lucas 1988) allowed policy reform to generate large gains by moving the 
economy to a higher growth path. Grossman and Helpman (1991) expanded the 
endogenous growth model by applying it to the open economy. Based on the idea that 
goods embody technological know-how, they showed that countries can acquire foreign 
knowledge through trade and increase their growth rate through trade liberalization. 
Coe and Helpman (1995) provided an empirical implementation of that model. 
They constructed an index of ‘foreign R&D’, defined as the trade-weighted sum of 
trading partners’ R&D stocks, and found for OECD countries that both domestic and 
‘foreign R&D’ have a large and significant impact on TFP, and that the latter increases 
with the economy’s openness. Coe et al. (1997) examined the impact of North-South 
trade-related technology diffusion on TFP in the South and obtained similar results. This 
led to other studies by, inter alia, Engelbrecht (1997), Falvey et al. (2002), and Lumengo-
Neso et al. (2005), which have tended to confirm Coe and Helpman’s (1995) findings. 
Other studies have extended the approach to the industry level, including Schiff and 
Wang (2006) who added South-South trade-related technology diffusion to the analysis 
and found a positive impact on TFP in the South, though a smaller one than that obtained 
from North-South trade.  
 
1.2. Brain Drain 
This paper focuses on the impact of the brain drain and whether it is different for 
small than for large states. Brain drain figures are presented in Table 1. The figures are 
based on Docquier and Marfouk (2006). The table presents skilled and overall emigration 
rates in 2000, as well as the ratio of the former to the latter (the schooling gap), for 46 
  3small developing states – defined by the UN as states with population below 1.5 million – 
and for other categories of interest. Skilled workers are defined as those with university 
education.  
Row 1 of Table 1 shows that small developing states experience an extremely 
high level of brain drain (43.2%). In other words, 3 out of every 7 individuals with 
university education live outside their country of origin. This rate is 2.8 times as large as 
the 15.3% overall migration rate.  
The table also shows a brain drain for small (all) high-income states of 23% 
(3.5%) or a ratio of 6.5 for small versus all states. The same ratio for developing 
countries is close to 6 (43.2% versus 7.4%). In other words, the impact of country size on 
the brain drain seems robust across a wide range of incomes. Moreover, the brain drain 
for all developing countries (7.4%) is over twice that of high-income countries (3.5%) 
and the schooling gap is close to four times as high (4.9% versus 1.3% or 3.8 times).           
The region with the highest small-state brain drain (74.9%) is the Caribbean (in 
“Latin America and the Caribbean”), and Table 2 shows that several states’ brain drain is 
well above 80%. The East Asia and Pacific region (mainly the South Pacific islands) 
follows, with a brain drain of 50.8%, with several countries over 70% (Table 2). Sub-
Saharan Africa is next with 41.7%, with several countries over 60% (Table 2).
1   
Thus, as far as small states are concerned, three out of four skilled Caribbean 
individuals live outside their country of origin, two out of four in East Asia and Pacific, 
and two out of five in Sub-Saharan Africa. Though Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has the 
lowest brain drain among these three regions, its schooling gap is more than double that 
                                                           
1 Table 2 also shows countries in Central America (Belize) and the Mediterranean (Malta) with brain drain 
above 50% and Cyprus with brain drain above 30%. 
  4in the other two developing regions. The main reasons are the wider income gap with 
developed countries and the smaller share of skilled individuals in the population.  
 
1.3. Main Findings and Contributions 
The contribution of this paper to the open-economy endogenous growth literature 
is twofold. First, it offers an empirical analysis of the relationship between North-South 
trade-related technology diffusion, country size and productivity growth in the South. 
Second, it examines how the impact on productivity growth of changes in such variables 
as the level of education, trade-related technology diffusion, or both, is affected by 
country size. The main findings are:  
i) Trade-related technology diffusion has a positive impact on productivity growth 
that is several times larger for small than for large states. Consequently, an increase in the 
degree of openness has a greater impact on productivity growth in small than in large 
states.  
ii) Similarly, education has a positive impact on productivity growth that is 
several times larger for small than for large states. Hence, the brain drain’s negative 
impact on productivity growth in small states is a multiple of that for other countries.   
iii) In terms of interaction effects, the impact of trade-related technology diffusion 
on productivity growth increases with the level of education, and this increase is also 
several times larger for small than for large states. Consequently, the brain drain reduces 
productivity growth both directly as well as through its interaction with trade-related 
technology diffusion, with a greater reduction for small than for large states. 
  5iv) The continuous growth of the North’s R&D over time has a positive impact on 
the South’s long-term productivity growth, an impact that is substantially greater for 
small than for large states.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
empirical framework. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 provides the empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes.    
 
2. Empirical Framework       
As discussed earlier, Coe and Helpman (1995) developed an empirical model to 
estimate the impact on TFP of North-North trade-related technology diffusion. Their 
estimation equation is: 








t c ct RD RD TFP β β ε β β λ λ α         (1) 
where ) ( t c λ λ is a country (time) fixed effect,  ( ) is the domestic (foreign) R&D 





Coe et al. (1997) use a similar model to explain North-South trade-related 
technology diffusion. However, due to lack of data for most developing countries, the 
equations they estimate do not include domestic R&D. They only use the foreign R&D 
stock 
f RD , which is referred to in this paper as ‘North foreign R&D’ and is denoted by 
‘NRD’ in our study. Abstracting from domestic R&D is unlikely to be a major problem 
because most of the world’s R&D is performed in developed countries.
2  
                                                           
2 In 1990, 96% of the world’s R&D expenditures took place in industrial countries (Coe et al., 1997). The 
share was 94.5% in 1995 (calculated from the World Bank database). Moreover, recent empirical work has 
shown that much of the technical change in individual OECD countries is based on the international diffusion 
of technology among the various OECD countries. For instance, Eaton and Kortum (1999) estimate that 87% 
of French growth is based on foreign R&D. Since developing countries invest much fewer resources in R&D 
  6Following Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe et al. (1997), we define the variable 







NRD ∑ ≡ ,            (2) 
where c indexes developing countries, k indexes OECD countries,   is the value 
added of country c,    is the value of imports of country c from OECD country k, and 
 denotes the R&D stock in OECD country k. The time variable t is omitted for 
simplicity. Equation (2) says that, for any country c, NRD is the sum, over all OECD 
countries k, of the R&D stock of country k, weighted by country c’s imports from OECD 




We estimate TFP equations as a function of NRD and a human capital variable, 
namely the average number of years of education for the population aged 25 and above, 
denoted by YE. We further add a dummy variable for small states, S3, in order to examine 
whether their impact on TFP growth differs from that of large ones.  The number of 
countries with a population of 1.5 million or less (on average over the period) in our 
sample of fifty developing countries is too small to be of much relevance. We use instead 
a population of 3 million or less as our definition of ‘small state’, with twelve countries 
or close to one fourth (24%) of the sample fitting the definition.
3  
In the empirical estimation, we also introduce several interaction terms. Two of 
them are interactions between each of the two explanatory variables and S3, i.e., NRD*S3 
and YE*S3. The other two are interactions between the two explanatory variables both for 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
than OECD countries, foreign R&D must be even more important for developing countries as a source of 
growth. 
3 We use the average population size over the period 1976-1997.  
  7small and large states, i.e., NRD*YE and NRD*YE*S3. A positive sign for the first two 
interaction variables would imply that the productivity-growth impact of NRD and YE is 
larger in small states, and similarly, a positive sign for NRD*YE*S3 would imply that the 
impact of NRD*YE is larger in small states.     
The estimation equation is specified in terms of five-year changes in the log of 
TFP (DlogTFP), in the log of NRD (DlogNRD) and in YE (DYE), i.e.: 
3 * 3 * log 3 log log S DYE S NRD D S DYE NRD D TFP D YS ct NS S ct Y ct N ct β β β β β α + + + + + =






c c D D ε γ γ ∑ ∑
= =
+ + +  (3)  
where   indicates country (year) dummies, capturing country- (year-)specific fixed 
effects. The equations estimated in Section 4 include equation (3) and variants thereof. 
( d c D D )
 
3. Data Description 
The data cover 50 developing (and transition) countries and 15 industrialized 
OECD trading partners over the period 1976 to 2002. The 50 developing countries – with 
the 12 small states in italics – are: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, 
Colombia,  Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Hong 
Kong (China), Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, I.R. of, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, 
Kuwait, Latvia, Macao (China), Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar 
(Burma), Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, 
Senegal, Singapore, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Uruguay and Venezuela.  
The log TFP index is calculated as the difference between the logs of value-added 
and primary factor use, with the inputs weighted by their income shares, i.e., 
  8K L Y TFP ln ) 1 ( ln ln ln α α − − − = , where α is the mean labor share over the available 
time period. The labor share is derived as the ratio of the wage bill over value added.  
Fixed capital formation used to construct capital stocks, value added, labor and 
wages, is from the World Bank data set described in Nicita and Olarreaga (2006), all 
reported in current US dollars at the 3-digit ISIC codes (Revision 2). Value-added is 
deflated by the US GDP deflator (1991=100). Fixed capital formation is also deflated by 
the US GDP deflator (1991=100), and capital stocks are derived from the deflated fixed 
capital formation series using the perpetual inventory method with a 5% depreciation 
rate.
4 The TFP index is constructed using the deflated value added, capital stocks, labor 
and its average income share with the formula provided.  
R&D expenditure for the 15 OECD countries is taken from OECD ANBERD 
with ISIC Revision 2 (2002) covering data from 1973 to 1998, and ANBERD with ISIC 
Revision 3 (2006) covering data from 1987 on. Since ANBERD ISIC 2 and ISIC 3 have 
12 years of data overlapping, we are able match the different specifications. The R&D 
stock in each country is constructed from R&D expenditures using the perpetual 
inventory method with a 10% depreciation rate. 
Bilateral trade data of the 50 developing countries with the 15 industrialized 
OECD countries at the 4-digit ISIC 2 level are taken from Nicita and Olarreaga (2006). 
We construct bilateral trade shares for each of the 50 developing countries with respect to 
each of the 15 OECD countries, as defined in equation (2).   
Average years of education, tertiary education completion ratio, and secondary 
school completion ratio for the population aged 25 and above are obtained by annualizing 
                                                           
4 Given that the data reported in Nicita and Olarreaga (2006) are in current US dollars, we use the US GDP 
deflator. In the empirical analysis, country-specific as well as year dummies are used in order to control for 
some of the distortions that might be present because of the conversion. 
  9the five-year averages in Barro and Lee (2000). There are several countries included in 
the sample that are not included in the Barro and Lee dataset. We matched each of these 
countries with other countries included in Barro and Lee, using real GDP per capita and 
government expenditure as a share of GDP per capita. 
Observations for a typical country consist of five five-year periods. With 50 
developing countries and no missing observations, that would give a sample size n = 250. 
However, we do have some missing observations (with n = 230) for production and trade 
data, and the sample is unbalanced.  
 
4. Empirical Findings  
Given that changes in openness, foreign R&D and education are unlikely to have 
an immediate impact on productivity growth, we specify the estimated equations in terms 
of five-year changes in the log of TFP, the log of NRD, and in YE, where the letter “D” 
before the variable indicates a five-year change. In other words, the estimated equations 
are specified in terms of the growth rate of TFP and NRD, and in terms of the change in 
YE. We estimate nine equations, all variants of equation (3) above. The results are 
presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 shows that the coefficient  N β  of DlogNRD is positive and significant in 
all nine regressions. Denote the coefficient  N β  for small states by  NS β  (equation (3)). 
The value of  N β  ranges from .269 to .615, and falls to a range of .269 to .397 when the 
variable DlogNRD*S3 is included in the regression. For instance, in equation (1),  N β  = 
.490 (significant at the 1% level). It falls to .269 (significant at the 10% level) in equation 
(2). On the other hand,  NS β  = .964 (significant at the 1% level) in the same equation. The 
  10impact  NS φ  of DlogNRD on DlogTFP in small states is  NS N NS β β φ + ≡  = .269 + .964 = 
1.233. Thus, the impact of DlogNRD in small states is over four times the impact in large 
countries, i.e.,  NS φ  > 4 N β . The same result obtains in equations (6) and (9), while  NS φ  > 
3 N β  in equations (5) and (8). 
The coefficient  Y β  of the education variable DYE ranges from .721 to .807, with 
significance of 1% or 5% in equations (1), (2), (3) and (5). However,  Y β  falls to between 
.194 and .310 and is no longer significant when the variable for small states, DYE*S3, is 
included in the regression. For instance, in equation (1),  Y β  = .766 (significant at the 5% 
level). Adding DYE*S3 in equation (4) results in a value  Y β  = .242 (not significant), with 
the coefficient for small states  YS β  = 1.075. The impact of DYE for small states is equal 
to  ≡ YS φ Y β YS β +  = 1.317, or over five times the impact in large countries, i.e., 
Y YS β φ 5 . Similar results are obtained in equations (6) to (9), with the ratio > Y YS β / φ  >  6  
in equation (7), > 5 in equation (8), and > 4 in equations (6) and (9). 
The coefficient  NY β  of the interaction effect DlogNRD*DYE ranges from 1.618 to 
1.701, with significance level of 5% or 10%, in regressions (3), (5), (7) and (8). Once the 
variable DlogNRD*DYE*S3 (with coefficient  NYS β ) is added to the regression (equation 
(9)),  NY β   falls to .726 and is no longer significant. On the other hand,  NYS β  = 2.966 
(significant at the 10% level), and the impact of DlogNRD*DYE in small states is 
NY NYS NY NYS β β β φ 5 3 = + 792 . > ≡ .  
The results provided in Table 3 imply that the effects of DlogNRD, DYE and 
DlogNRD*DYE on DlogTFP in small states are systematically greater than in large 
  11countries. Equation (9) – which includes all the explanatory variables and is our preferred 
equation – shows that the impact of DlogNRD is more than 4 times greater in small states 
than in large countries, and the impact of DYE (DlogNRD*DYE) is more than 5 times 
greater.  
As shown in Table 1, the share of migrants who are skilled is larger than the share 
among residents (Docquier and Schiff, 2008), implying that the brain drain reduces the 
average level of education YE and thus reduces productivity growth. Second, since the 
interaction effect of education and ‘foreign R&D’ (the diffusion of technology from the 
North to the South) is positive, it implies that the brain drain reduces the absorption 
capacity of developing source countries. In other words, the brain drain reduces the 
impact that the diffusion of technology from the North has on productivity growth, and 
this reduction is greater for small states than for large ones. In fact, the loss in 
productivity growth when this interaction effect is taken into account is close to three 
times as high (193% higher) in small states than in the other countries, rather than 16% 
higher when the interaction effect is not taken into account.  
Third, small states also tend to suffer from significantly higher brain drain rates. 
Among developing countries, the brain drain in 2000 was 43.2% for small states and 
7.4% for all developing countries, with the former close to six times greater than the 
latter. Thus, the negative impact of the brain drain is larger in small states both because 
their TFP growth is more sensitive to the brain drain and because the brain drain is 
substantially greater in these states.  
 These results are subject to an important caveat. A recent literature has argued that 
the loss in human capital is smaller than the brain drain because of a brain gain, a concept 
  12unrelated to return migration by some of the skilled migrants. Rather, this literature argues 
that a brain gain obtains because the positive probability of emigration and of earning a 
higher salary abroad raises the expected return to education and provides an incentive to 
acquire more of it. The change in the stock of human capital or net brain gain is the 
difference between the brain gain and the brain drain.  
Several studies argue that under certain conditions, the net brain gain might 
actually be positive, implying that the incentive effect of the brain drain on human capital 
accumulation is larger than the brain drain itself. For instance, a recent study by Beine et 
al. (2008) finds that the net brain gain is negative for most developing countries, 
particularly in the case of small states, though it tends to be positive in the very large 
countries where the brain drain is small (the number of skilled migrants may be large, 
though) such as Brazil, China, India, and others.      
Thus, the brain drain would be expected to result in a reduction in TFP growth in 
most developing countries, and particularly in small states. There are two reasons for that. 
First, as shown in Tables 2 and 3, the brain drain is close to six times larger in small states 
than in large ones; and ii) the very large states seem to experience a net brain gain rather 
than a brain drain, which is not the case for small states (Beine et al., 2008).  
Moreover, the difference in the impact of the brain drain on TFP growth between 
small states and the larger states may be even greater than in the absence of a brain gain 
because the net brain gain remains highly negative for the small states  while that for the 
larger states tends to be positive (see Beine et al., 2008).  
  
  135. Conclusion 
This paper examined the impact of North-South trade-related technology 
diffusion on TFP growth in the South. It contributes to the open-economy endogenous 
growth literature by offering an empirical analysis of the impact of the brain drain on 
productivity (TFP) growth, of the relationship between country size and TFP growth, and 
between a combination of country size, brain drain and North-South trade-related 
technology diffusion, on the one hand, and TFP growth on the other.  The main findings 
are:  
i)  TFP growth increases with trade-related technology diffusion, and the 
increase is substantially larger for small states than for large ones;  
ii)  Education has a positive impact on TFP growth, and the increase is 
substantially larger for small states than for large ones;  
iii)  The share of migrants who are skilled is larger than the share of residents 
who are skilled, implying that the brain drain has a negative impact on TFP growth, and 
that the impact is larger (in absolute value) for small than for large states;  
iv)  The impact of the interaction of trade-related technology diffusion and 
education on TFP growth is positive, and this impact is greater for small than for large 
states.  
Thus, TFP growth in small states is more sensitive to changes in the brain drain, 
to changes in North-South trade-related technology diffusion, and to the interaction 
between the two. Moreover, small states are more open to trade and thus have higher 
levels of North-South trade-related technology diffusion. This is another reason why TFP 
  14growth in small states would react more strongly to changes in trade-related technology 
diffusion.  
Brain drain levels are also substantially larger in small than in large states, 
causing greater losses in TFP growth in the former than in the latter. Hence, there are two 
reasons for the greater negative impact of the brain drain in small than in large states: a) 
the former’s TFP growth is more sensitive to the brain drain and b) its brain drain is 
substantially larger. 
The continuous growth of the North’s R&D over time has a positive impact on the 
South’s long-term productivity growth, an impact that is substantially greater for small 
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Table 1. Emigration rates in 2000 by Country Group (%) 
 










Small States (pop < 1.5 
million) 
46 43.2  15.3  2.81 
          by population size        
Population from 0 to 0.5 million  32 41.7  21.0  2.0 
Population from 0.5 to 1 million  8 47.2  15.7  3.0 
Population from 1 to 1.5 million  6 40.9  9.8  4.2 
         by region / income        
East Asia and Pacific  12 50.8  17.0  3.0 
Latin America and Caribbean  10 74.9  35.0  2.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa  10 41.7  6.0  6.9 
High-income countries  12 23.0  10.7  2.1 
 
Other Groups of Interest 
      
Small Islands Developing States  37 42.4  13.8  3.1 
Population from 1.5 to 3 million  15 20.9  7.1  3.0 
Population from 3 to 4 million  13 18.5  10.0  1.8 
World average  192 5.3 1.8  3.0 
Total high-income countries  41 3.5  2.8  1.3 
Total developing countries  151 7.4 1.5  4.9 
Skilled (average) emigration rates are defined as number of skilled (all) migrants divided by the sum 
 of skilled (all) migrants. Schooling gap = Skilled emigration rate / Average emigration rate. 
Source : Docquier and Marfouk (2006) 
 
  17Table 2.  Highest Brain Drain (%) in a Sample of Small States in 2000, by Region 
    
 
Region/Country                    Brain Drain (%) 
 
1. Sub-Saharan Africa 
 Cape Verde                                    67.4 
  Gambia                                         63.2 
  Mauritius                                       56.1 
















  Guyana                                          89.0 
Grenada                                         85.1  
St Vincent and the Grenadines      84.5 
St Kitts and Nevis                         78.5 
 
 
3. Central America 
Belize                                            65.5 
 
                         
4. South Pacific 
 Samoa                                           76.4 
 Tonga                                           75.2 
 Fiji                                                62.2     
 Micronesia, Federated States       37.8 
 
 
5. Mediterranean     
  Malta                                          57.6 





































  18 Table 3: TFP Growth and Small States 
 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DlogNRD  .490 .269 .595 .509 .375 .291 .615 .397 .337 
  (3.71)***  (1.83)*  (4.18)***  (3.87)*** (2.42)**  (1.98)** (4.33)***  (2.57)*** (2.14)** 
 
DYE  .766 .807 .721 .242 .761 .310 .194 .261 .296 
  (2.47)**  (2.66)***  (2.33)** (0.56) (2.52)** (0.73)  (0.45)  (0.62)  (0.71) 
 
S3  -.117 .338 .048 -.559 .519 -.087 -.396 .092 .206 
  (-.09)  (0.27) (0.04) (-0.44) (0.42) (-0.07) (-0.31) (0.07) (0.16) 
 
DlogNRD*
S3   .964    .982  .949  .966  1.158 
   (3.12)***    (3.21)***  (3.09)***  (3.17)***  (3.59)*** 
DlogNRD* 
DYE     1.618  1.694  1.627  1.701  .726 
     (1.89)*   (2.03)**   (1.91)*  (2.05)**  (0.73) 
 
DYE*S3      1.075    1.019  1.082  1.025  .970 
       (1.74)*  (1.69)*  (1.77)*  (1.71)*  (1.63)* 
DlogNRD* 
DYE*S3           2 . 9 6 6
. 7 5 ) *
 
           ( 1  
Adj.  R2 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.31 
Obs.  230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. *** (**) (*) indicates 1(5) (10) % significance level. Figures in parentheses are robust t-statistics. The sample 
includes 50 developing countries covering the period of 1976 to 2002. NRD is trade-related North foreign R&D, defined in Section 2. YE is the average 
number of years of schooling of the population aged 25 and above. Dr is the dummy for R&D-intensive industries, and S3 is a dummy variable capturing 
small states 
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Appendix: R&D-Intensive Industries 
 
The industry-level data were aggregated in two industry groups: R&D-intensive 
aggregate industry and low R&D-intensity aggregate industry in order to examine 
whether there were significant differences between the two. The R&D-intensity measure 
used (R&D expenditures divided by sales) is based on the US, the technologically more 
advanced country. The regressions were estimated by adding a dummy variable for 
R&D-intensive industries for all countries. The results are shown in Table A1 below for 
all the sample countries.
5  
The preferred specification is equation (5) which includes all the variables. It 
shows that the differential impact of North-South trade-related technology diffusion (i.e., 
of DlogNRD*Dr) on TFP growth in R&D-intensive industries relative to non-intensive 
industries is small and not significant. Second, the differential impact of the interaction of 
DlogNRD and education YE (i.e., of DlogNRD*YE*Dr) on TFP growth in R&D-intensive 
industries relative to non-intensive industries is not significant either. The regressions 
were also estimated with small state dummies, with similar results: variables interacted 
with the dummy Dr were not significant. Consequently, we decided to estimate the model 
without disaggregating industries according to their R&D intensity.  
                                                           
5 We do not distinguish between small and large states in this regression. 
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Table A1. TFP Growth and R&D Intensity 
 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DlogNRD 0.348 0.289 0.366 0.373 0.295 
    (7.05)*** (5.27)*** (7.38)*** (7.46)*** (5.54)*** 
YE  0.292 0.289 0.319 0.318 0.328 
    (5.99)*** (5.97)*** (6.45)*** (6.47)*** (6.82)*** 
DlogNRD*Dr   0.043      0.03 
     (1.30)
     (1.53) 
       
         
DlogNRD*YE     0.326  0.217  0.148 
       (3.33)***  (2.45)**
  (1.69)* 
DlogNRD*YE
*Dr      0.068  0.049 
        (1.60)  (1.50) 
       
         
Obs.  230 230 230 230 230 
Adj. R
2  0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 
 
Note: *** (**) (*) indicates 1 (5) (10) percent significance level. Figures in parentheses are robust t-statistics. The 
sample includes 50 developing countries covering the period of 1976 to 2002. NRD is trade-related North foreign 
R&D, defined in Section 2. YE is the average number of years of schooling of the population aged 25 and above. Dr 
is the dummy for R&D-intensive industries, and S3 is a dummy variable capturing small states. 
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